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In a two-period tax competition model with provision of local public goods, we ana-
lyze efficiency properties of double taxation reliefs incorporating either the exemption
method, the tax credit system or the full taxation after deduction system. Foreign
direct investments are presumed to be one-way and characterized by long-term mergers
and acquisitions. We find that in case of (i) tax revenue maximization the exemption
method implies inefficiently low tax rates, whereas the full taxation after deduction
system leads to inefficiently low / efficient / inefficiently high tax rates. In case of (ii)
welfare maximization each of these tax rules can be efficient. The (limited) tax credit
system, however, is shown to always result in inefficiently low / inefficiently high tax
rates. A numerical example reveals that no tax regime per se entails efficiency. In case
of (i), a ranking of tax systems subject to the Pareto criterion is shown to depend on
the parameters of the production function. Regarding (ii) the exemption method is
preferable as it is proven to be the least inefficient tax regime.
JEL classification: H21, H73, H87
Key words: tax competition, double taxation relief, tax rules,
profit taxation, mergers and acquisitions
1. Introduction
One main effect of globalization is the presence of foreign direct investments (FDI) as defined
by the OECD (2008), which can roughly be separated into greenfield investments as well as
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In the former case investment abroad causes a reallocation of
production factors whereas M&A cause a shift in ownership structures. In the pre-crisis era,
the UNCTAD (2011) reports that in 2007 the worldwide FDI inflow culminated in 1.97 trillion
US-Dollar and reached 2.17 trillion US-Dollar in outflow. Two years before, these capital flows
accounted just for 0.98 as well as 0.88 trillion US-Dollar indicating the inherent dynamic of
FDI.1
Bearing in mind the remarkable volume of FDI, fiscal implications thereof are captured by a
large strand of public economics literature.2 One of the associated fields of interest is the relief of
double taxation of repatriated income generated abroad. At this, a disctintion is drawn between
three different tax rules typically used in this kind of treaties and their implications regarding
efficiency. These regimes are the exemption method (EM), the tax credit system (TCS) as well as
the full taxation after deduction system (FTADS). The first system resembles pure source-based
taxation. Following the residence principle, the TCS and the FTADS take as basis the world
income of the tax debtor, where the fiscal treatment of repatriated income varies accordingly. In
the TCS the government at home credits taxes on foreign income paid abroad against the overall
tax debt. Depending on the tax ratio, the foreign tax load refunded by the government at home
may exceed gains from taxing repatriated income if the foreign tax rate lies above that one at
home. Even though this is technically possible, in practice double taxation treaties generally
incorporate a ”saving clause”. That is, crediting is limited up to the point where the tax credit
at home is nonnegative. In the FTADS, the tax base at home is comprised of gross world income
minus taxes paid abroad.
Early contributions, such as e. g. Hamada (1966), build their analysis upon the assessment of
national income for given tax rates. Considering two countries and a one-way capital flow, it is
found to be globally advantageous to include the TCS in a double taxation treaty as long as the
condition of the saving clause is fulfilled. Form the perspective of a capital exporting country,
however, the FTADS is preferable as this regime ceteris paribus provides the largest tax base.3
Endogenizing tax rates in a Nash equilibrium, Bond and Samuelson (1989) ascertain, that if
discriminatory tax rate setting is feasible, the FTADS results in higher national income in both
countries.4
More recent contributions, such as e.g. Janeba (1995) and Davies (2003) extend the above-
mentioned approach by considering the recommendation of the OECD (2010) to base income
taxation on non-discriminatory tax rates. Janeba finds, that without coordination governments
are indifferent regarding the tax regimes in concern. It is pointed out, that in an international
1Since the global economic crisis represents a short term shock, statistic data for the time frame after 2007
are omitted.
2See Fuest et al. (2005) for a comprehensive survey of capital mobility and tax competition.
3See also Richman (1963) and Musgrave (1969).
4In their approach, the TCS turns out to cause international capital movement to disrupt due to prohibitvely
high tax rates. See also Feldstein and Hartmann (1979), who find this result to be true in a Stackelberg equilibrium.
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agreement on a double taxation treaty, the TCS is the preferred tax rule. Compared to the
FTADS and the EM, neither a side payment (as in the FTADS) nor a harmonization of tax
rates (as in the EM) is required for efficiency. In contrast, Davies’ approach predicates on a
model with two countries and two-way capital flows. He evaluates the OECD model tax treaty,
where the FTADS is precluded, by considering either symmetric or asymmetric countries. It
is concluded that if countries are symmetric, the TCS yields efficient allocation of capital even
without coordination. This outcome relies on identical equilibrium tax rates in both countries,
such that the effective tax rates on repatriated income are zero. In case of asymmetric countries,
it is not clear whether a similar result can be achieved. In a harmonization process, however,
the FTADS is recommended to be excluded.
Dickescheid (2004) investigates tax competition associated with tax financed provision of local
public goods in a partial equilibrium model. Taking into account the model treaty of the
OECD, Dickescheid focuses on two symmetric countries that mutually exchange foreign direct
investment. In absence of discriminatory tax rate setting, it is scrutinized which tax rule a
mutual double tax treaty should comprise.5 He finds the EM to be unambiguously preferable
over the TCS. The basic intuition behind this outcome is the following. Both tax rules generally
imply a well known capital flight externality inducing inefficiently low tax rates. The TCS,
though, features a second externality which he refers to as tax export externality. By virtue
of this tax regime treasury income is linked to production and, thus, to the tax base abroad,
such that the domestic tax rate is a cost factor of production in the foreign country. Taxation
of repatriated income, then, leads to a decline in the foreign tax base and national tax yield is,
hence, achieved at the expense of the foreign country’s tax receipts. This induces inefficiently
high tax rates. As Dickescheid assumes that both countries are sufficiently small, the influence of
national tax policy on the world capital market is negligible, such that the interest-based capital
flight externality is absent in his approach. In the TCS, however, the tax export externality
prevails and source-based taxation turns out to be efficient. A mutual double tax treaty, then,
should not contain the TCS because of the need to internalize the tax export externality in order
to achieve efficiency.
It is worth noting that the aforementioned studies implicitly treat FDI as greenfield investment.
Comparing this assumption with data provided by the UNCTAD (2011), a sole consideration of
greenfield investment tends not to reflect real world investment behaviour. On the contrary, an
incorporation of M&A in evaluating double tax treaties seems worthwhile, since global M&A is
indicated to amount some one trillion US-Dollar in 2007.
Besides a growing strand of literature focussing on the interplay of taxation and ownership
structures of multinational entities6, Becker and Fuest (2011) analyse tax competition with lo-
cal public good provision considering both endogenous greenfield investment as well as M&A.
They set forth a model wherein a representative household initially owns a given set of national
firms with exogenous production. Amongst other things, it is shown that if one country hosts
a multinational enterprise after merging in absence of greenfield investments, source-based tax-
5Note, that Dickescheid finds a symmetrical application of the EM or the TCS to be superior.
6See e. g. Becker and Fuest (2010), Haufler and Schulte (2011) as well as Huizinga and Voget (2009).
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ation of corporate income is efficient if taxes on dividends are precluded. This outcome arises
as the representative household is supposed to choose between capital market investments and
merging firms. If corporate taxation is, say, increased, the after-tax profit of firms decreases
ceteris paribus rendering investments in additional firms less beneficial. Less mergers then are
substituted by increased saving, which in turn lowers equilibrium global capital cost. Turning
to the vendor of a firm, less revenue from selling firms leads to a reduction in capital market
activities, which results in a downturn of the interest rate at the same amount. Efficiency, thus,
comes by virtue of an undistorted capital market.
We set forth a tax competition model with local public good provision considering one-way
mergers and acquisitions and at least two countries the world economy consists of. Net profit
generated by an affiliate abroad is fully repatriated to the owner of a multinational enterprise.
Efficiency properties of the three tax rules then are obtain by scrutinizing externalities caused
by individually optimal profit taxation. We find that in case of tax revenue maximization, the
EM involves inefficiently low tax rates. This outcome reflects typical implications found in tax
competition literature. Source-based taxation is inefficient, since profit taxation distorts the
capital market equilibrium. This is captured by a positive capital flight externality as well as a
positive terms of trade externality.
In the TCS and the FTADS, another negative direct as well as a negative indirect tax export
externality arise where the root of these effects can be found in the double taxation agreement
itself. The direct tax export externality causes the government at home to take into account the
tax load of the multinational enterprise abroad. The indirect tax export externality captures the
fact that due to these tax rules, net profit of the foreign affiliate is dependent on both the foreign
tax rate and the tax rate in the home country of the multinational’s owner. The implication of
these effects is that each national government has the incentive to derive national tax income
at the expense of the respective other country. In case of the FTADS, it turns out that this
tax regime might be able to reach efficiency, as those negative externalities could be exactly
counteracted by the capital flight as well as the terms of trade externality. In the TCS, the same
reasoning is true regarding profit taxation in the home country of the MNE. If, however, there is
a tax levied on profit generated by an affiliate abroad, only the negative direct tax export effect
is proven to emerge as long as the saving clause is fulfilled. It follows, that the TCS mandatorily
requires cooperative tax rate setting to implement efficiency.
In case of welfare maximization, the above results with respect to the EM and the FTADS are
accompanied by a negative income externality that represents a tax-induced variation in revenue
from individual saving. As a consequence, both tax regimes result in either inefficiently low,
efficient or inefficiently high intensity of taxation. The TCS is again shown to generally fail
Pareto efficiency.
A numerical example elucidates that no tax system generally results in a Pareto efficient out-
come. If governments maximize treasury income, the production structure of the multinational
is crucial to the choice between tax regimes. Depending on the functional parameters, we find
different rankings of tax regimes, such that any system might be preferable. Provided that the
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fiscal objective is to maximize welfare, results obtained suggest source-based taxation, i.e. the
EM, to be preferred over the TCS and FTADS.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2 we present the model utilized
including basic assumptions as well as implications of merging firms. In the succeeding section 3
we elaborate the underlying three-stage Nash game by presenting comparative static results and
efficiency properties of uncoordinated profit tax rate setting given the fiscal objective of tax
revenue and welfare maximization. In doing so, we focus on either large or small countries. In
section 4, we assess double tax treaties by relying on a numerical example. Eventually, section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
Basic assumptions. The world exist for two periods and the global economy consists of n ≥ 2
countries. In each country there is a large number of internationally identical firms owned by a
large number of internationally identical residents. Normalizing the amount of national actors
to unity, we consider a national representative firm owned by a domestic representative resident
in country z ∈ {1, . . . , n}.7 The firm produces a nume´riare consumption good according to the
production function F (kz) which is identical in all countries. The consumer good is produced
with capital input kz. The function F is assumed to have a positive (Fk > 0) and decreasing
(Fkk < 0) marginal productivity.
8 We furthermore implicitly presume that there is an exogenous
second input factor, which can be conceived of as a patent, for example. In the following, this
factor is needed in order to motivate an output-enhancing merger of firms. Each firm produces
solely in period two and purchases capital on the world capital market at user cost of capital r.
Denoting the profit tax rate in country z by tz ∈ [0, 1), the after-tax profit generated by each
national firm in period two is given by
piz = (1− tz) [F − ϑrkz]− (1− ϑ)rkz (1)
where ϑ ∈ [0, 1) is the deduction rate of capital cost, which is the same for all countries.
Each resident spends her initial endowment e for consumption in period one (c1z) and for invest-
ment in the capital market at rate sz, so that
c1z = e− sz. (2)
In the second period, resident z’s consumption is financed by her income from saving, (1+ r)sz,
and by profit income from ownership of firm z. Since we abstract from any dividend taxation,
the after-tax profit of firm z fully accrues to resident z, leading to
c2z = (1 + r)sz + piz . (3)
7The representative firm in country z is subsequently referred to as firm z. Likewise, the representative
resident in country z is denoted as resident z.
8Throughout this essay partial derivatives are represented by corresponding subscripts.
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Besides consumption in period one and two, resident z benefits from the provision of a local
public good gz in period two. Her utility is given by
Uz = u(c
1
z) + c
2
z + V (gz) (4)
where the sub-function u(c1z) is strictly concave and V (gz) is characterized by Vg > 0 ≥ Vgg.
9
In country z tax revenue is gained by taxing firm z’s profit and is exclusively used to finance
the provision of the local public good. It is assumed that the marginal rate of transformation
between the local public and private good equals unity. The fiscal budget constraint of the
government in country z (hereafter government z) is given by
gz = tz [F − ϑrkz] . (5)
The merger’s benefit. Below we focus on a cross-border merger between two firms into one
multinational enterprise (MNE). Owing to the symmetry of the initial situation, it is assumed
that the world economy can equally be separated into two subsets. The first subset αn with
α = 0.5 may comprise those countries that are inhabited by investors. We refer to one of these
countries as country j.10 The second subset βn with β = 1 − α includes those countries a firm
is sold from by the representative resident. One country being part of this subset is referred to
as country m.11 Resident j, thus, expands by investing in firm m leading to n/2 MNEs. Due
to the production function and the associated decreasing returns of scale, a sole combination of
production processes of both firms would generally be unprofitable since
F (kj) + F (km) > F (kj + km). (6)
The driving force for merging, therefore, needs to incorporate sufficient economies of scope.
Consider the case, that due to the implicitly assumed second input factor both firms are en-
dowed with a certain set of patents. Sufficient economies of scope, then, are considered to be
characterized by the compatibility of these two sets of patents, such that the union of both sets
enables the MNE to apply more general patents positively influencing production output.
Since we do not want to employ in-firm structures in detail, we assume that this benefit is
only attributable to the MNE’s production as a whole and falls to the corporation’s output
F (kj + km) in terms of a multiplier. Provided that ∆¯ denotes the increase in productivity,
merging is output-enhancing if
F (kj) + F (km) ≤ ∆¯F (kj + km). (7)
9Supposing intertemporal income effects to be sufficiently small, we are able to employ this type of utility
function.
10Quantities associated with this country will be highlighted by the subscript j, such that, for example, the
national tax rate reads tj .
11Likewise, quantities connected with this country are labelled with the subscript m.
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It follows from eqns. (6) and (7), that ∆¯ > 1. Additionally, we assume that each of the former
unrelated firms equally benefits from merging. Let the well-behaved function F z = F z(kz) with
z = j,m represent production of a MNE’s affiliate in country z, post-merging production of the
MNE, then, can be specified by
∆¯F (kj + km) = ∆¯
(
F j(kj) + F
m(km)
)
As each production site equally benefits from merging and considering the identity of both for-
mer unrelated firms j and m, we set F j = Fm.
Merging firms and its consequences. If resident j is supposed to be the owner of the MNE,
we define country j as the home country and country m as the foreign country. Investment
incentives are presumed to be exclusively driven by an increase in production, such that possible
tax planning motives of resident j, as e.g. financing merging by debt to benefit from interest
deduction, are excluded. At this, we simplify resident j’s investment behaviour by assuming
that merging firm j and m is equity-financed and represents a long-term decision.12 Thereby
we are allowed to state, that if the investment took place, any impact of taxation, which in turn
is more of a short-term nature, does not harm the benefit of merging, see Haufler and Schulte
(2011).
Consider the net profit generated in country m to be fully repatriated and taxes to be levied
following the residence principle. The after-tax profit of the MNE, then, consists of net income
from production at home and in the foreign country minus a possible extra tax burden µ due to
cross-border corporate income taxation.
Depending on the tax regime incorporated in a double tax treaty, post-merging after-tax profit
of the MNE varies in consequence of µ. Let p˜ij denote resident j’s post-tax income from owning
the multinational, we get13
p˜ij = (1− tj)
[
∆¯F j − ϑrkj
]
− (1 − ϑ)rkj︸ ︷︷ ︸
net profit of production in j
+ (1− tm)
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
− (1− ϑ)rkm︸ ︷︷ ︸
net profit of production in m
−µ (8)
where the additional tax burden is given by
µ =


0 in the exemption method,

(tj − tm)
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
if tj ≥ tm ,
0 else
in the tax credit system,
tj(1− tm)
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
in the full taxation after deduction system.
12Merging both firms, thus, can be seen as a pure share deal. Abstracting from asset deals allows us to exclude
any specific financial tax regulations from our approach. For details, see e.g. Becker and Fuest (2011).
13Hereafter a tilde emphasizes quantities after merging whenever a distinction is necessary.
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and discriminatory tax rate setting is presumed to be outlawed. Without a tax treaty, gov-
ernment j taxes gross profit of both affiliates such that µ = tj [∆¯F
m − ϑrkm]. It follows that
gross profit in m is taxed twice. In order to relief double taxation, the government at home
implements a double tax treaty including either the EM, the TCS or the FTADS. With the
EM employed, profit generated abroad is exempted from the global tax base. Each tax base,
therefore, includes the national gross profit, exclusively, and is equivalent to the source principle
leading to no cross-border corporate income taxation.
The TCS reduces double taxation of government j by crediting the taxes paid to government m
against the global tax liability of the MNE in country j. From government j’s point of view,
it is assumed that this system is only favourable, if its profit tax rate is at least equal to that
of country m, see e. g. Davies (2003). If tax rates are the same, government j’s tax receipts
based on repatriated income compensates the refund paid to the MNE. If tj falls short of tm,
the MNE gains a full refund of the tax load paid in the foreign country plus a partial refund of
its tax liability at home. We abstract from the latter in line with several mutual double taxation
agreements containing a ”saving clause” and assume a limited tax credit by government j. This
arrangement is included, for example, in treaties between Germany and Denmark14 as well as
between the USA and Bulgaria15. If the double tax treaty includes the FTADS, the additional
tax burden µ of the MNE comprises the net income generated in m. Consequently, the net
profit of production in m and the gross profit of production in j represent the global tax base
at home.
Since merging is not costless, we denote by P the price resident j has to pay for the firm abroad.
Selling firm m obviously causes resident m to cease one out of two sources of income in period
two. Assuming in line with e.g. Becker and Fuest (2011), that revenue from selling firm m is
untaxed, resident m is only willing to participate in the market for merger if and only if
(1 + r)P ≥ pim
is fulfilled in period two, where pim is given by eqn. (1). That is, the present value of revenue
from selling firm m meets at least the income generated by firm m without merging.
Turning to resident j, on the one hand merging firm j and m results in increasing income, i. e.
p˜ij > pij where pij is characterized by (1) and p˜ij is determined in (8). On the other hand, the
price P for firm m has to be paid, such that merging is at all possible. Consequently, resident j
merges firm j and m if the profit generated by the MNE net of merging cost and taxes meets
at least her outside option, such that16
p˜ij − (1 + r)P ≥ pij . (9)
Assuming perfect competition in the market for mergers, either participation condition is satis-
fied with equality, such that (1+ r)P = pim and p˜ij − (1+ r)P = pij. It turns out, that corporate
14See art. 24, par. 2b therein.
15See art. 22, par. 4b therein.
16Note, that eqn. (9) might intensify the pressure on the merging benefit ∆¯. As the investment is supposed to
be long-term beneficial, we assume ∆¯≫ 1.
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taxation is capitalized by the equilibrium price for merging and each resident is ensured to earn
her exogenous outside option. Formally, this can be seen by substituting the first equation into
the second, i.e. p˜ij = pij+pim.
17 Total differentiation with respect to any national profit tax rate
tz gives dp˜ij/dtz = 0. Hence, resident j’s income generated by the MNE net of merging cost and
taxes is unaffected by national profit taxation as the price P is adjusted accordingly in order
to maintain indifference between merging both firms and her outside option. Turning to resi-
dent m, the equilibrium price P equals her discounted outside option, such that P = pim/(1+r).
Totally differentiating with respect to any tax rate tz gives dP/dtz = −P/(1+r)
dr
dtz
. Given that
taxation distorts the capital market equilibrium, the price P changes correspondingly in order
to maintain indifference of resident m between selling and keeping firm m.
To elucidate expenditures and gains from merging in total, we adapt the budget constraints (2),
(3) and (5) presented above. With respect to the MNE’s after-tax profit defined in eqn. (8) and
equity-financed merging, for resident j we obtain
c˜1j = ej − sj (10)
c˜2j = p˜ij + (1 + r)(sj − P ) (11)
for consumption in both periods. Considering cross-border income taxation, government j’s
budget constraint is given by
g˜j = tj
[
∆¯F j − ϑrkj
]
+ µ . (12)
Turning to country m, first and second period consumption of resident m is given by
c˜1m = em − sm (13)
c˜2m = (1 + r)(sm + P ) (14)
and the fiscal budget contsraint of government m reads
g˜m = tm
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
. (15)
3. Assessing tax regimes – a theoretical approach
In order to analyze efficiency properties of the three tax rules considered in a double tax treaty,
we base our model on a three-stage game for a given benefit of merging.18 At the first stage,
government j chooses one out of three tax rules double taxation of the MNE owned by resident j
is relieved by. These rules are the EM, the TCS or the FTADS. At the second stage, govern-
ment j and m determine individually optimal corporate tax rates given the tax rule from stage
one. Eventually, the representative resident as well as the MNE set optimal consumption and
17Note, that this expression implies eqn. (7) to be satisfied with equality.
18Endogenizing the benefit of merging results in an additional stage where resident j decides as to whether
merge firm j and firm m. This, however, significantly complicates the following analysis without adding much
insight.
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production in the final stage. Endogenous quantities at this stage are saving, capital demand
and global capital cost.
We solve this game by making use of backward induction commencing our analysis with stage
three. At this, the MNE and each resident take as given the double tax relief and national
profit tax rates. Maximizing the MNE’s after-tax profit and utility, capital cost as well as factor
demand turn out to be functions of national tax rates whereas individual saving is a function of
capital cost.
At the second step of backward induction, each government maximizes its fiscal objective over
the national profit tax rate subject to the budget constraints (10) to (15). In doing so, each
government takes into account the effect of taxation on saving, capital demand as well as on
global capital cost. Governments, however, take as given the tax rates of other countries. Put
differently, we focus on a Nash tax competition game.
In the last step of backward induction, government j chooses a tax system incorporated in a
double tax treaty given optimal results obtained in the preceding stages. As we are interest
in efficiency properties of the three tax rules, we do not need to fully analyse the underlying
game. Instead, we can base the following analysis on externalities generated by uncoordinated
profit taxation. These externalities obtained provide the insight whether or not tax rates are
set Pareto efficiently considering the respective tax system.19
Tax competition in general. Focussing on the second step of backward induction, we con-
sider two different fiscal objectives. That is, either national tax revenue or domestic welfare
is maximized.20 In order to implement these objectives in our model, we rewrite the utility
function of resident z ∈ {1, . . . , n} from (4) as the fiscal objective function
Yz = η
[
u(c1z) + c
2
z
]
+ V (gz) (16)
where η is a binary parameter with
η =


1 for welfare maximization
0 for tax revenue maximization
For η = 1, eqn. (16) turns into the national welfare function, since the right hand side of (16)
represents utility of resident z. For η = 0 the first-order condition with respect to the national
tax rate tz reads
dYz
dtz
∣∣∣∣
η=0
= Vg
dgz
dtz
= 0 .
19Pareto efficiency is characterized by externalities amounting to zero. Accordingly, a positive externality
induces inefficiently low tax rates while a negative externality induces the opposite.
20In tax competition literature, the assumption of tax revenue maximization is made by e.g. Kanbur and Keen
(1993). Edwards and Keen (1996) discuss implications of a combination of both objectives with respect to capital
tax competition.
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Because of the monotonic increasing function V (gz), maximizing the same is tantamount to
maximizing national tax revenue. Summing up eqn. (16) over all n countries gives the joint
objective function
Y :=
n∑
z=1
Yz = n (αYj + βYm) . (17)
Totally differentiating (17) with respect to tj gives the effect of domestic taxation in country j
on all other countries’ objective in a general equilibrium, i.e.
dY
dtj
= αn
dYj
dtj
+ βn
dYm
dtm
.
Due to our focus on one MNE and the two countries its affiliates are located in, we need to
identify other countries in the respective subset. This is done by setting (αn − 1)Y−j and
(βn − 1)Y−m, where the first expression captures all other countries in first subset while the
second expression does so considering the second. The effect of uncoordinated tax rate setting
in country j, thus, reads
dY
dtj
=
dYj
dtj
+ (αn− 1)
dY−j
dtj
+
dYm
dtj
+ (βn − 1)
dY−m
dtj
(18)
In an uncoordinated Nash equilibrium the first term in (18) becomes zero. With respect to
government m, the externality of profit taxation inflicted by government j is given by the third
term dYm
dtj
. The terms (αn−1)
dY
−j
dtj
and (βn−1)dY−m
dtj
represent the impact of corporate taxation
at home on fiscal objectives of other governments in each subset.
Likewise, totally differentiating (17) with respect to the corporate tax rate in country m leads
to
dY
dtm
=
dYm
dtm
+ (βn − 1)
dY−m
dtm
+
dYj
dtm
+ (αn − 1)
dY−j
dtm
(19)
where the first term again is zero due to uncoordinated optimal tax rate setting in coutnry m.
Following the above reasoning according to eqn. (18), the identification of the second to fourth
term applies mutatis mutandis.
Since the following remarks build upon on the last three terms in (18) and (19), note that totally
differentiating each national fiscal objective (16) with respect to another country’s corporate tax
rate leads to
dYz
dtx
= η
[
du(c˜1z)
dtx
+
dc˜2z
dtx
]
+ Vg
dg˜z
dtx
z, x ∈ {j,m} ∧ z 6= x (20)
10
It can be shown, that the term in squared brackets can be reduced to s dr
dtx
, such that (20)
becomes21
dYz
dtx
= ηs
dr
dtx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:IE
+Vg
dg˜z
dtx︸︷︷︸
=:TE
z, x ∈ {j,m} ∧ z 6= x (21)
where the acronyms IE and FE stand for income externality and tax base externality. The
latter caputres the effect of taxation abroad on the national tax base.22 Regarding the former
externality, recall that the equilibrium price for merging capitalizes any tax-induced changes
in the MNE’s after-tax profit or in revenue from selling firm m. Second period income earned
in these two ways, thus, turns out to be unaffected by taxation as P ensures each resident to
receive her exogenous outside option. The residual effect on private consumption is depicted
by a tax-induced variation in saving return in period two and amounts to zero in case of tax
revenue maximization (η = 0).
3.1. Large countries
Tax competition in large countries. In sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.3 we set forth externalities in
case of large countries, where the world economy is assumed to consist of n = 2 countries and
one MNE, respectively. This approach allows us to focus on efficiency properties in the home
country of the MNE and in its foreign country. In section 3.2 this assumption is relaxed by
assuming that there are many small countries with half as many MNEs.
For n = 2 countries, the second and fourth terms in eqns. (18) and (19) disappear. Each third
term therein remains, such that the general influence of taxation at home and in the foreign
country on the respective other fiscal objective reads
dYm
dtj
= η s
dr
dtj︸︷︷︸
=:IE
+Vg
dg˜m
dtj︸︷︷︸
=:TE
(22)
as well as
dYj
dtm
= η s
dr
dtm︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:IE
+Vg
dg˜j
dtm︸︷︷︸
=:TE
. (23)
21REFEREE: See the appendix for the derivation of the income externality.
22The first derivative of the subfunction V (·), i.e. Vg > 0, is omitted from analysing tax base externalities,
since it represents a positive transformation of dgz/dtx thereby not changing results.
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3.1.1. Exemption method
Profit & utility maximization. Consider government j to exempt foreign profits from na-
tional taxation and µ = 0 in (8). The first-order conditions for profit maximization of the MNE,
then, are given by
∂p˜ij
∂kj
= (1− tj)
[
∆¯F jk − ϑr
]
− (1− ϑ)r = 0 (24)
∂p˜ij
∂km
= (1− tm)
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
]
− (1− ϑ)r = 0 (25)
They constitute, that the MNE equates marginal productivity and marginal cost of production
in each country. Resident z’s first-order condition for utility maximization with respect to saving
is given by
uc1z(c˜
1
z) = (1 + r) z ∈ {j,m} (26)
According to (26), marginal utility of consumption in period one equals the marginal cost of
corresponding forgone consumption in period two. Moreover, eqn. (26) implicitly determines
the saving function sz = S
z(r) with Szr > 0, i.e. capital supply is increasing in the user cost of
capital. Since sz is identical for all residents, we simplify notation by skipping subscripts, such
that sz = s and s = S(r). Equations (24) to (26) and the capital market clearing condition
n∑
i=1
ki = ns (27)
determine the general market equilibrium, where capital demand and the interest rate are func-
tions of n cooperate tax rates. Totally differentiating (24) to (27) with respect to the national
profit tax rates tj and tm yields the comparative static results
23
dr
dtj
< 0
dr
dtm
< 0 (28)
ds
dtj
= Sr
dr
dtj
< 0
ds
dtm
= Sr
dr
dtm
< 0 (29)
dkj
dtj
< 0
dkm
dtm
< 0 (30)
dkj
dtm
> 0
dkm
dtj
> 0 (31)
dk−j
dtj
> 0
dk−j
dtm
> 0 (32)
dk−m
dtj
> 0
dk−m
dtm
> 0 (33)
Consider an increase in the national profit tax rate tz with z ∈ {j,m}. As a consequence,
production cost in the respective country raise, so that capital demand of the MNE in z declines.
This leads to an excess supply in the capital market. For the purpose of equilibrating the capital
23For a detailed outline see the appendix.
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market, the world interest rate falls, see (28). A lower return on saving, however, induces each
resident to save less, see (29). Additionally, a reduced interest rate implies a reduction in the
MNE’s capital cost and an increase in capital demand. It can be shown that the latter effect
is smaller than the tax-induced increase in production cost causing overall capital demand in
country z to decrease, see (30). Subsequently, (27) is rebalanced at a lower level.
Equation (31) reveals, that production abroad benefits from an increase in the national corporate
tax rate. This is due to the fact, that tz does not directly influence production in country
x ∈ {j,m} with x 6= z. Instead, production in x is affected indirectly via a global downturn in
capital cost, cf. (28), which enhances production abroad. Put differently, eqns. (30) and (31)
imply that if government z increases the national profit tax rate, the MNE shifts part of its
production to country x in order to avoid increased production cost.
Eventually, eqns. (32) and (33) illustrate how production of MNEs owned by other investors
is influenced by a tax rate change in country z = j,m. At this, k−j depicts capital demand of
another MNE in that country the respective investor, who is not resident j, resides in. Likewise,
k−m reflects capital demand of the foreign affiliate owned by resident −j. Since tj and tm do
not directly influence production of other MNEs, their production is solely affected via a change
in global capital cost. As a higher tax rate in country z decreases capital cost, cf. (28), the
after-tax profit of other MNEs benefits by virtue of less production cost.
Tax competition in the EM. Due to the EM resembling pure source-based taxation, profit
taxation turns out to be symmetrical in our approach. Hence, it suffices to focus on externalities
imposed on treasury income in m as the opposite case applies mutatis mutandis. In case of tax
revenue maximization (η = 0), the tax base externality in eqn. (22) reads
dg˜m
dtj
= tm
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
] dkm
dtj
− tmϑkm
dr
dtj
> 0 . (34)
The first term represents the change in tax revenue owing to a change in capital demand. This
effect is usually referred to as capital flight externality. Consider again an increase in tj. As
discussed above, a higher tax rate at home induces the MNE to shift part of its production to
the foreign country, cf. (30) and (31). This increases the tax base in country m. Additionally,
the world interest rate decreases, cf. (28), which leads to diminished capital cost deduction of
the MNE in country m. This effect captured by the second term in (34) also enlarges the tax
base in m and is referred to as terms of trade externality. Since both effects are positive, the
tax base externality (34) itself is positive inducing inefficiently low profit taxation.
Changing the governmental objective into national welfare maximization (η = 1), eqn. (22)
associated with (28) reveals that a tax-induced decrease in revenue from saving counteracts the
positive tax base externality, such that we can state
Lemma 1 Suppose that the world economy consists of n = 2 countries, then the EM induces
inefficiently low tax rates in case of national tax revenue maximization. Regarding national
welfare maximization, the sign of the sum of income and tax base externality is ambiguous.
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3.1.2. Tax credit system
Profit & utility maximization. Next, consider government j to set off payments of foreign
taxes on profit generated in m against the overall tax liability of the MNE at home. That is,
with
µ = (tj − tm)
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
in (8), presuming that the saving clause is met (tj ≥ tm), we obtain the MNE’s first-order
conditions for profit maximization
∂p˜ij
∂kj
= (1− tj)
[
∆¯F jk − ϑr
]
− (1− ϑ)r = 0, (35)
∂p˜ij
∂km
= (1− tj)
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
]
− (1− ϑ)r = 0. (36)
An implication of the TCS is that from the MNE´s point of view, global income is taxed solely
by the home country. This is due to government j rebating the foreign tax load of the MNE.
Like in case of the EM, eqns. (35) and (36), the first-order conditions for utility maximization
with respect to saving (26) and the capital market clearing condition (27) determine the general
market equilibrium. Totally differentiating (26), (27), (35) as well as (36) with respect to tj and
tm gives the comparative static results
24
dr
dtj
< 0 (37)
ds
dtj
= Sr
dr
dtj
< 0 (38)
dkj
dtj
< 0
dkm
dtj
< 0 (39)
dk−j
dtj
> 0
dk−m
dtj
> 0 (40)
dr
dtm
=
ds
dtm
=
dkj
dtm
=
dkm
dtm
=
dk−j
dtm
=
dk−m
dtm
= 0 (41)
The interpretation of a tax-induced change in capital cost, eqns. (37), saving, (38), as well as
the reaction of other MNE’s factor demand, (40), is the same as regarding the EM, cf. eqns.
(28), (29) and (32), and is not repeated here. Instead, we need to clarify comparative static
results according to (39) and (41).
Consider again an increase in the profit tax rate in country j. Capital demand in country j
consequently decreases whereas capital demand in country m decreases, too. The interpretation
of the former effect follows that one discussed in the context of the EM. The latter effect, however,
arises because of the fact, that tj is the sole relevant tax rate according to total production,
see (35) and (36). The tax rate in country m is irrelevant since taxes paid by the MNE to the
treasury in m will be refunded by government j. In other words, from a fiscal point of view, the
affiliates of the MNE reside solely in country j. If tj is raised production cost increase, which
24For a detailed outline see the appendix.
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tends to lower capital demand. Additionally, a higher tax rate leads to a decline in the world
interest rate, cf. (37). Since it can be shown that the former negative effect again dominates
the latter positive effect of less capital cost, capital demand in m falls because of an increase in
tj. Note that in contrast to the EM, the MNE is not able to avoid increased production cost by
means of shifting factor demand from one country to another. This implies that relative to the
EM capital cost as well as saving decline stronger under the TCS.
Equation (41) reveals that corporate taxation in country m has no effect on endogenous quan-
tities in the first step of backward induction as government j de facto pays the tax bill of the
MNE in country m.
Tax competition in the TCS. Prior to discussing externalities, we need to emphasize that the
TCS induces governmentm to fully exploit the saving clause, see e.g. Wilson (1999). First, recall
that the process of setting optimal tax rates typically requires a national government to weigh
marginal benefits and marginal cost of taxation. If an internal solution to this maximization
problem exists, the optimal intensity of taxation, then, is typically given if the former matches
the latter. Second, be aware of the fact that in the limited TCS the MNE’s tax load abroad
is refunded at home. Based upon the assumption, that tax revenue is exclusively gained by
taxing gross profit, see (15), marginal cost of taxation in country m end up to be absent under
the TCS in a way that there is no tax-induced downturn in production, see comparative static
results in (41). No matter what tax rate is set in the foreign country the tax base of the
foreign affiliate remains the same as it only depends on the profit tax rate in country j. The
capital market, thus, is unaffected by taxation in m as a tax-induced change in capital demand
is absent. Consequently, individual saving also is unaltered as the equilibrium interest rate
remains unswayed. It follows, that in country m there is only a marginal benefit of taxation in
terms of a marginal increase in national tax yield. Given that the local government maximizes
the latter or national welfare, the national profit tax rate, then, is set as high as possible, i.e.
tj = tm.
25 This behaviour is captured by
Proposition 1 Suppose that the TCS is implemented in a double tax treaty and that the sa-
ving clause is fulfilled (tj ≥ tm), then government m always sets the same profit tax rate as
government j.
Proof. See the appendix.
Addressing efficiency properties of the TCS in case of tax revenue maximization, the externality
imposed by government j on the tax base in country m is given by
dg˜m
dtj
= tm
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
] dkm
dtj
− tmϑkm
dr
dtj
≷ 0 (42)
25Note, that the saving clause is crucial for the following proposition to hold. Provided that the corporate tax
rate in m exceeds that one in country j, government j would not have opted for the TCS in order to relief double
taxation. Moreover, the optimal tax rate in m would then be tm = 1, which immediately follows from proposition
1, and tax revenue in m turns out to be entirely financed by government j.
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As discussed above, profit taxation in j harms capital demand of the MNE in m, see (39).
The first term in (42) captures this reaction and, thus, is negative. Setting tax rates non-
cooperatively, government j does not anticipate that domestic tax revenue is gained at the
expense of tax revenue in m due to less capital demand abroad. We refer to this mechanism as
indirect tax export externality. Because of only one entrepreneurial relevant tax rate26, a capital
flight externality as in the EM is not existent.
The second term in (42) is positive, cf. eqn. (37). It represents the terms of trade externality,
such that a higher tax rate in country j raises tax revenue in country m via a reduction of the
MNE’s local capital cost deduction. The overall property of non-cooperative profit taxation of
government j regarding tax revenue in country m, thus, is ambiguous.
Considering the tax base externality inflicted by profit taxation of government m, tax revenue
in country j reacts according to
dg˜j
dtm
= −
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
< 0 (43)
That is, as long as there is production in country m, an increase in tm reduces tax revenue in
country j after crediting. In a Nash equilibrium, government m does not consider government j’s
tax relief which is carried out at the expense of tax revenue in j. The higher profit taxation is
in country m, the more foreign tax load has to be credited by government j. We refer to this as
direct tax export externality.
Turning to national welfare maximization, we apply η = 1 in (22) and (23). The comparative
static effect in (37) implies that in case of corporate taxation in j the ambiguous tax base
externality (42) is accompanied by a negative income externality, which is due to a tax-induced
downturn in revenue from saving. The income externality regarding profit taxation in m is zero
as the local corporate tax rate does not distort the capital market, see (41). This leads to
Lemma 2 Suppose that the world economy consists of n = 2 countries and governments maxi-
mize national tax revenue, then the TCS leads to an ambiguous tax base externality in country m
while it is negatively signed in country j. Results are the same in case of domestic welfare ma-
ximization.
3.1.3. Full taxation after deduction system
Profit & utility maximization. Finally, supposing that government j fully taxes the repa-
triated net profit of the MNE generated in country m, we get
µ = tj(1− tm)
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
26Recall the first-order conditions for profit maximization (35) and (36)
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in (8) leading to the first-order conditions for profit maximization in country j and m
∂p˜ij
∂kj
= (1− tj)
[
∆¯F jk − ϑr
]
− (1− ϑ)r = 0 (44)
∂p˜ij
∂km
= (1− tj)(1− tm)
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
]
− (1− ϑ)r = 0 (45)
In contrast to the tax rules discussed above, capital demand in country m now depends both
on tj and tm. Again, equations (44) and (45) together with resident z’s first-order condition for
utility maximization with respect to saving, cf. (26), and the capital market clearing condition
(27) determine the general market equilibrium. Totally differentiating (26), (27), (44) and (45)
with respect to tj and tm leads to the comparative static results
27
dr
dtj
< 0
dr
dtm
< 0 (46)
ds
dtj
= Sr
dr
dtj
< 0
ds
dtm
= Sr
dr
dtm
< 0 (47)
dkj
dtj
≷ 0
dkm
dtj
< 0 (48)
dkj
dtm
> 0
dkm
dtm
< 0 (49)
dk−j
dtj
> 0
dk−j
dtm
> 0 (50)
dk−m
dtj
> 0
dk−m
dtm
> 0 (51)
The economic intuition behind the tax-induced change in capital cost, (46), saving, (47), and
in other MNE’s factor demand ,(50) and (51), is the same as in the EM. From equations (48)
and (49), however, it can be seen that because of the actual tax rule capital demand in j and
m reacts differently according to taxation in country j and m.
dkj
dtm
> 0 in combination with
dkm
dtm
< 0 indicates the typical reaction of a tax-induced shift in the MNE’s capital demand,
which has already been discussed in the context of the EM, cf. (31). This effect, however, is
not generally true in the opposite case of increased taxation in country j. dkm
dtj
< 0 from (48)
builds upon the fact, that due to the FTADS the affiliate in the foreign country considers both
corporate tax rates as cost factors. This implies that if tj is increased capital demand in m is
affected in two ways. First, there is a direct effect based on increased production cost, which
lowers capital demand. This reaction entails a fall in user cost of capital, cf. (46), such that
a second indirect effect emerges. Due to lower capital cost the latter tends to increase capital
demand in the foreign county. It can be shown, that the indirect effect is outweighed by the
former direct one, such that capital demand in country m falls given that the corporate tax rate
at home is increased.
27For a detailed outline, see the appendix.
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In contrast to other tax regimes, capital demand in country j reacts ambiguously because of a
change in domestic taxation, see (48). Consider again an increase in tj and note that
dkj
dtj
=
[
∆¯F jk − ϑr
]
(1− tj)∆¯F
j
kk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∂kj/∂tj <0
+
(1− tjϑ)
(1− tj)∆¯F
j
kk
dr
dtj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:A>0
.
On the one hand, kj decreases directly due to increased taxation (first term). On the other hand,
capital demand increases indirectly due to less capital cost. This is captured by the second term
A with (46).
dkj
dtj
≷ 0 then elucidates that exclusively in case of the FTADS and a change in
country j’s profit tax rate, the increase in production cost does not strictly dominate the gain
from less capital cost as shown associated with other tax regimes.
Since the sign of dkj/dtj depends on the deduction rate of capital cost, suppose ϑ to be raised.
It follows, that the direct negative effect becomes weaker as ϑ increases, i.e.
∂2kj
∂tj∂ϑ
> 0. The
more deduction of capital cost is permitted the less tax base ceteris paribus has to be declared
by the MNE. Accordingly, an increase in taxation is less harmful to capital demand in ∂kj/∂tj
if ϑ is raised.
As regards the indirect second effect, note that ∂A∂ϑ < 0. A higher depreciation rate renders the
tax-induced reduction in capital cost less beneficial. The less tax base has to be declared by the
MNE, the less beneficial is a decrease in production cost.
Eventually, it can be shown that if capital cost deduction is ruled out, the direct effect strictly
dominates the indirect one, such that
dkj
dtj
∣∣
ϑ=0
< 0. It immediately follows, that 0 <
∣∣∂A
∂ϑ
∣∣ < ∂2kj∂tj∂ϑ
must hold, i.e. the indirect effect falls slower in ϑ than the direct one increases therein. Under
the FTADS, then, the overall sign of
dkj
dtj
is given by28
dkj
dtj


>
=
<

 0 if
ϑ


>
=
<


−nSr(1− tj)(1 − tm)∆¯F
j
kkF
m
kk + (αn− 1)(1 − tm)F
m
kk + (βn − 1)F
j
kk
tj(αn− 1)(1 − tm)Fmkk + tj(βn− 1)F
j
kk + tmβn(1− tj)F
j
kk
> 0 .
Tax competition in the FTADS. Focussing on tax revenue maximization (η = 0), first,
totally differentiating the fiscal budget constraint (15) with respect to tj determines the tax
base externality imposed on government m. This is given by
dg˜m
dtj
= tm
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
] dkm
dtj
− tmϑkm
dr
dtj
≷ 0 (52)
The first-order condition for profit maximization in country m (45) elucidates that, as under
the TCS, tj is a cost factor abroad. The indirect tax export externality (first term), then, is
28See the exact comparative static results presented in the appendix.
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negative, cf. (48), whereas the terms of trade externality (second term) is positive, cf. (46). The
intuition for these two effects can be found in the discussion linked to the TCS and the EM.
Setting tax rates non-cooperatively, government j does not take into account, that corporate
taxation at home reduces both capital demand and capital cost deduction in the foreign country.
The sign of (52), thus, is indeterminate.
Totally differentiating the fiscal budget constraint of government j, (12), with respect to tm
yields the tax base externality inflicted by government m and reads
dg˜j
dtm
= −tj
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm] + tj(1− tm)
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
] dkm
dtm
+ tj
[
∆¯F jk − ϑr
] dkj
dtm
− tjϑ (kj + (1− tm)km)
dr
dtm
≷ 0
(53)
Consider the tax rate in country m to be raised. According to (53) the indirect tax export
externality (second term) is accompanied by a direct tax export externality (first term). The
intuition for the latter is that an increase in tm cetris paribus raises the tax load of the MNE
abroad and the required tax relief of government j. The indirect effect stems from the tax-
induced downturn in production in m. Accordingly, a higher tm lowers capital demand abroad
such that the repatriated profit and, thus, the tax base of the MNE at home declines, see (48).
Moreover, capital demand in country j increases because of a tax-induced shift in production,
cf. (49). This capital flight externality is captured by the third term in (53). Eventually, a
higher tax rate in m ceteris paribus implicates a positive terms of trade externality, cf. (46).
The tax load of the MNE in country j increases by the fourth term in (53) due to less capital
cost deduction. Because of the negative direct and indirect tax export externality as well as the
positive capital flight and terms of trade externality, the overall outcome of (53) is ambiguous.
Turning to welfare maximization (η = 1), the ambiguous tax base externalities (52) and (53)
each are combined with a negative income externality. We can, thus, infer
Lemma 3 Provided that the world economy consists of n = 2 countries, profit taxation under
the FTADS leads to ambiguous externalities in (22) and (23) regardless of the fiscal objective.
3.1.4. Implications for large countries
(η = 0) dYm/dtj dYj/dtm
EM > 0 > 0
TCS ≷ 0 < 0
FTADS ≷ 0 ≷ 0
Table 1: Tax revenue maximization with
n = 2 countries
(η = 1) dYm/dtj dYj/dtm
EM ≷ 0 ≷ 0
TCS ≷ 0 < 0
FTADS ≷ 0 ≷ 0
Table 2: Welfare maximization with n = 2
countries
Based on eqns. (22) and (23), table 1 and 2 summarize lemma 1 to 3 and we conclude
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Proposition 2 Suppose that the world economy consists of n = 2 countries and governments
uncooperatively maximize national tax revenue (η = 0), then
i) the EM induces inefficiently low tax rates,
ii) the TCS requires cooperative tax rate setting to internalize externalities,
iii) the FTADS features ambiguous externalities.
Regarding the fiscal objective of welfare maximization, the above results can be aggregated to
Proposition 3 Given that countries are large compared to the rest of the economy and govern-
ments maximize national welfare,
i) the EM and the FTADS cause ambiguous externalities,
ii) the TCS leads to inefficiently high or inefficiently low tax rates.
Proposition 2 and 3 reveal, that in case of large countries, the EM is generally not superior.
If the fiscal objective is to maximize treasury income, the tax base externalities obtained in
our approach suggest that the EM unambiguously results in inefficiently low tax rate setting.
The FTADS, however does not generally imply inefficiency. It could be possible, that those
partial effects driven by a tax-induced distortion in the capital market are counterbalanced by
the direct and/or indirect tax export externalities. If governments maximize national welfare,
the EM and/or the FTADS might avoid tax competition. Hence, a general preclusion of the
FTADS from double tax treaties, as suggested by the OECD (2010), might be detrimental.
Nevertheless, the TCS always requires a process of cooperative tax rate setting to gain Pareto
efficiency.
3.2. Small countries
In order to provide a comprehensive analysis and to link our approach to common assumptions
in tax competition literature, we alter the influence of national tax policy on the world capital
market. The assumption of large countries (n = 2) and one MNE is now relaxed, such that the
global economy consists of n → ∞ countries with n/2 MNEs. Owing to the large number of
countries and half as many MNEs, capital demand of a single affiliate is now small compared to
the rest of the economy. If national taxation, then, is increased the repercussion on the global
capital market caused by a downturn in national capital demand also turns out to be small. As
a consequence, local tax policy has a vanishingly small effect on the equilibrium interest rate,
i.e. limn→∞
dr
dtj
= limn→∞
dr
dtm
= 0 irrespective of the tax system in use. In order to establish
results in a general equilibrium encompassing all small countries in the global economy, recall
that our analysis initially builds upon one MNE with affiliates in country j and m. We therefore
commence this section by focussing on these two countries.
Suppose that governments maximize national tax receipts. Provided that national tax rate
setting exhibits a vanishingly small influence on the global capital market, any interest-driven
externalities imposed by taxation in either country j or m, such as the capital flight or the terms
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of trade externality, also are vanishingly small. Since in the EM, the tax base externality solely
comprises these two effects, the influence of national profit taxation on the other country’s tax
revenue given by (34) is absent. It follows, that the tax base externality is zero in case of the
EM. Furthermore, note that under the TCS and under the FTADS both the direct as well as
the indirect tax export externality arise because of the double tax treaty itself. Hence, these
effects are present independent of relative country size. Considering the tax base externalities
(42) and (43) with respect to the former tax system as well as (52) and (53) associated with the
latter, interest-driven effects are lacking such that either tax base externality is unambiguously
negative.29 In case of welfare maximization, the income externality represented by the first
term in (22) and (23) is absent, since national tax policy has a vanishingly small effect on the
remuneration of capital market investment of resident j and m. We can, thus, state
Lemma 4 Suppose, that governments maximize national tax revenue or national welfare and
that the global economy consists of sufficiently many countries (n→∞), then eqns. (22) and (23)
i) are zero in case of the EM.
ii) are negatively signed in case of the TCS as well as the FTADS. The direct and/or the
indirect tax export externality prevail.
Proof. See the appendix.
In order to assess tax regimes in a general equilibrium considering small countries, we now turn
to all other countries in the respective subset. Recalling (18) and (19), the effect of uncoordi-
nated profit taxation in country j and m on the fiscal objective of other countries is given by
(αn− 1)
dY
−j
dtj
+ (βn− 1)dY−m
dtj
as well as by (αn−1)
dY
−j
dtm
+(βn−1)dY−m
dtm
, respectively.30 At this,
we also need to take into account the effect of taxation in j and m on other MNEs. Compar-
ative static results discussed previously reveal that capital demand of other affiliates generally
increases due to intensified taxation in j and m concerning the EM and the FTADS, see (32),
(33), (50), (51). In case of the TCS, this is only true considering profit taxation in country j,
see (40) and (41). This outcome is driven by a global tax-induced downturn in capital cost,
which enhances other MNEs’ production and their respective tax base. Since each country and
each affiliate now is presumed to be small compared to rest of the economy, the benefit of less
capital cost caused by taxation in j and m accruing to another single MNE’s capital demand is
vanishingly small as the tax-induced interest reaction itself is negligible. However, summing up
over all (n/2 − 1) MNEs in (αn − 1) + (βn − 1) countries with n → ∞, this benefit turns out
to be unambiguously positive in (18) and (19). The intuition for this outcome is the following.
Suppose government j to increase its profit tax rate given that e.g. the EM is incorporated in
a double tax treaty.31 This leads to an increase in production cost of the MNE’s affiliate in
29Note, that due to comparative static results (37) to (41), eqn. (43) is negative anyway.
30It should be borne in mind that the effect of taxation in country j and m on other countries’ fiscal objectives
can only consist of interest-driven effetcs, i.e. the income externality, the capital flight externality and/or the
terms of trade externality.
31Note that in the FTADS as well as in the TCS, capital demand of the foreign affiliate in countrym is affected,
too. The following intuition, though, applies mutatis mutandis in case of these two tax systems without changing
the basic intuition. Furthermore, considering an increase in profit taxation in country m yields the same intuition
in case of the EM and the FTADS. Regarding the TCS, it has already been stated that taxation in m is irrelevant
with respect to other countries’ fiscal objective.
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country j and a drop in optimal capital demand. Since the affiliate is small compared to rest of
the economy, the capital market equilibrium is hardly distorted. To equilibrate the latter, the
interest rate yet needs to adjust to a very small extent nearly imperceptible to another MNE’s
affiliate. Its factor demand, however, increases by a minute amount. As there is a large number
of entities, the aggregate over all vanishingly small reactions of all other MNEs’ affiliates, then,
ends up to be significantly different from zero. Simply put, the aforementioned capital flight
externality capturing capital movement within a MNE in case of n = 2 is now replaced by an
inter-MNE capital flight effect.
Besides the capital flight externality, other countries’ tax base in each subset are generally
affected by the terms of trade externality. As countries are small, the influence of national tax
policy in country j and m on the interest rate and, hence, on capital cost deduction of another
MNE is negligible. Given that tax revenue of another single government hardly benefits from a
very small tax-induced reduction in national capital cost deduction, the sum of these vanishingly
small effects over all other (αn− 1)+ (βn− 1) countries in each subset becomes positive in (18)
and (19). This result applies to the EM and the FTADS. Regarding the TCS, comparative
statics in (37) reveal that this is only true with respect to taxation in country j. It is zero in
the opposite case of intensified corporate taxation in country m, see (41).
Eventually, we turn to the income externality imposed on (αn − 1) + (βn − 1) representative
residents. This effect depends on the tax-induced variation in the interest rate, see the first
term in (20). As stated above, the income externality with respect to the resident of a single
country is negligible since her revenue from saving is hardly affected given that countries are
small. The sum of those negligible income effects accruing to each of the (αn − 1) + (βn − 1)
representative residents, however, is negative. Each of these residents loses a very small amount
in second-period income generated by capital market investment if taxation in country j or m
is increased. This, again, is true in case of the EM, the FTADS and profit taxation in country j
given the TCS, see again (41). We therefore reason
Lemma 5 Suppose that the world economy consists of sufficiently many countries (n → ∞),
then an uncoordinated increase in corporate taxation in country j or m given the EM or the
FTADS
i) generally increases tax revenue in other countries.
ii) has an ambiguous effect on other countries’ welfare.
Provided that the TCS is implemented in a double tax treaty, profit taxation in country m has
no effect on other governments’ fiscal objectives. Externalities caused by corporate taxation in
country j feature the same results as those in presence of the EM or the FTADS.
Having scrutinized the second and fourth terms in (18) and (19), table 3 and 4 summarize lemma
4 and 5.
Compared to the efficiency properties in case of large countries, cf. propositions 2 and 3, there
is no difference in quality. The EM involves inefficiently low tax rates in case of tax revenue
maximization as local governments do not consider the capital flight and the terms of trade
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(η = 0) dY/dtj dY/dtm
EM > 0 > 0
TCS ≷ 0 < 0
FTADS ≷ 0 ≷ 0
Table 3: Tax revenue maximization with
n→∞ countries
(η = 1) dY/dtj dY/dtm
EM ≷ 0 ≷ 0
TCS ≷ 0 < 0
FTADS ≷ 0 ≷ 0
Table 4: Welfare maximization with
n→∞ countries
externality. Regarding welfare maximization the two positive effects come along with a negative
income externality, such that in the latter case source based taxation might be too low, efficient
or too intense.
As the direct and indirect tax export externality emerge independently of country size and fiscal
objective, the FTADS could be efficient. At this, the positive impact of the terms of trade
externality and the capital flight externality on other countries might be offset by negative tax
export effects (tax revenue maximization) or by negative income and tax export effects (welfare
maximization).
Eventually, the TCS requires tax coordination irrespective of the fiscal objective. The driving
force for this outcome still is the fact that government m can freely set the national profit tax
rate bearing in mind the saving clause. Corporate taxation in m harms the fiscal objective of
government j via a negative direct tax export externality and causes no international capital
movement. The aforementioned positive capital flight and terms of trade externalities caused
by tax-induced capital cost variations, then, are not able to arise under the TCS in order to
counteract the tax export effect inflicted by government m.
Since we aim at evaluating the three tax systems considered, the results obtained are unrewarding
as it is still unclear which tax regime is preferable. In order to answer this question, in the
following we turn to a numerical example and fully analyze the underlying Nash tax competition
game.
4. Assessing tax regimes – a numerical approach
To gain further insights into the present model, we focus on large countries and make use of
the production function F z(kz) = (a− bkz)kz with z ∈ {j,m} and a = 0.08 as well as b = 0.5.
The benefit of merging is given by ∆¯ = 2.5. The deduction rate of capital cost and residents’
endowment are assumed to be ϑ = 0.5 and, respectively, e = 1. The fiscal objective function
(16) is presumed to be of the type
Yz = η
[
ln(e− sz) + c
2
z
]
+ λgz
where λ can be interpreted as marginal cost of public funds. Because of distortive corporate
taxation, these marginal cost contain opportunity cost as well as welfare cost of taxation leading
to λ > 1, see e.g. Browning (1976). A common finding of empirical contributions is an estimated
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range of marginal cost of public funds from 1.3 to 2.0, see e.g. Kleven and Kreiner (2006). Results
are presented for λ = 1.5.
Table 5 summarizes equilibrium values after merging if governments maximize domestic tax
receipts (η = 0) and set tax rates non-cooperatively. Note, that in the three columns on the
right, we focus on tax revenue given by eqns. (12) as well as (15) and the sum thereof. As λ is
identical across both countries, it suffices to determine g˜z with z ∈ {j,m}. Table 6 illustrates
equilibrium values considering the cooperative solution in the same setting.
In order to contrast the three tax regimes, we have two equivalent approaches at hand. Since
the cooperative solution is the same in each tax system, we can either focus on the level of tax
revenue in Nash equilibria or on the deviation thereof from the efficient outcome. By choosing
the latter, we evaluate tax regimes in view of global efficiency. Note, that the difference between
global tax revenue in Nash equilibria and the efficient outcome captures the sum of tax base
externalities inflicted by government j and m considering each tax system, viz. eqns. (34), (42),
(43), (52) and (53).
Given the parameters above, table 5 and 6 elucidate that joint tax revenue with respect to
individually optimal tax rates falls short of the cooperative solution by 3.44% in the TCS,
5.74% in the EM as well as 6.61% in the FTADS. Consequently, if cooperative tax rate setting is
missing or impossible, the TCS should be opted for by government j from a global perspective.
Regarding tax revenue in country j, however, the local government has a strong incentive to
implement the FTADS in a double tax treaty, as domestic treasury income is some 70% and
67% larger than in the EM or the TCS. At the same time, government m forfeits averagely 72%
of national tax revenue.
Recalling proposition 2 and the ambiguous outcome therein, a variation in the parameter b
reveals, that the implication of table 5 is significantly dependent on parameters of the production
function.32 It can be shown that the ranking of tax regimes is related to the parameter b in such
a way that three threshold values can be identified. That is
b ≥ 0.78⇒ EM ≥ TCS > FTADS (−2.96% > −7.48%)
0.78 > b ≥ 0.461 ⇒ TCS > EM ≥ FTADS (−3.53% > −6.43%)
0.461 > b ≥ 0.195 ⇒ TCS ≥ FTADS > EM (−4.23% > 18.7%)
b < 0.195 ⇒ FTADS > TCS > EM
where the percentage value in parenthesis denotes the respective deviation of Nash equilibria
from the efficient solution if the previous expression is satisfied with equality.
We find that results presented in table 5 are only true in case of b ∈ (0.461, 0.78). If b is
set above the upper threshold, the ranking regarding the TCS and the EM is reversed, such
32Other parameters similarly affect the result of our numerical approach. However, attempting to reproduce
the following results for b = 0.5 via a variation in other parameters fails on feasible equilibrium values or on
plausible parameter values.
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that for b > 0.78 the latter ends up to be the least inefficient tax rule. Additionally, a higher
b renders the FTADS more inefficient. Regarding a decrease in b with b ∈ (0.195, 0.461) the
ranking derived via table 5 is changed with respect to the second and third position. The lower
b is the more inefficient is the EM. The FTADS, however benefits from less b up to the point
where, compared to the EM and the TCS, joint tax revenue is closest to the efficient solution
(b < 0.195). Moreover, if the parameter considered is sufficiently small, it turns out that the
FTADS results in an efficient outcome at b ≈ 5 ·10−5, whereas the TCS and the EM fall short of
the cooperative solution by 5.05% and 99.9%, respectively. By and large, a variation in b shows
up to affect Nash equilibria to a varying extent. The EM reacts strongest compared to the
FTADS and the TCS. The latter system, on the contrary, reacts weakest as inefficiency raises
from 2.96% (b = 0.78) to 5.05% (b ≈ 5 · 10−5).
A sensitivity analysis reveals that a 30%-variation in a, ∆¯ and ϑ is linked to reasonable adjust-
ments in b to maintain the above differentiation. At this, b has to be raised or lowered by 40% at
the utmost with ∆¯ having the greatest and a having the smallest influence. The endowment e,
however, can be shown to be crucial for present results. An increase or decrease therein by
30% turns out to provide infeasible equilibria. To guarantee validity, only a 2%-variation in e is
viable also requiring appropriate adjustments in b by a maximum shift of some 58%.
Turning to welfare maximization, table 7 and 8 depict quantities set in a Nash equilibrium as
well as with regard to cooperative tax rate setting. Utility of each representative resident and
global welfare in the former case can be found in the three columns on the right of table 7,
whereas the last column in table 8 indicates global welfare if tax rates are set cooperatively.33A
first insight is, that government j again has a strong incentive to relief double taxation using the
FTADS. At this, domestic welfare is some 50% and 55% larger than with respect to the EM or
the TCS. Welfare in country m, on the contrary, is averagely 60% larger if government j desists
from the FTADS.
Following the above reasoning, we find that considering uncoordinated tax rate setting, the EM
provides the highest global welfare deviating from efficiency by 1.29%. The sum of income and
tax base externality in the TCS and the FTADS amounts to 4.72% and, respectively, 7.33% of
the cooperative outcome. In contrast to the case of tax revenue maximization, a threshold value
with respect to the parameter b is absent.
Conducting a sensitivity analysis via a 30%-variation in a, ∆¯ and ϑ as well as λ ∈ [1.3, 2] proves
the outcome to remain robust. Again, endowment e is crucial as only a maximum increase of
5% or a decrease of not more than 0.3% ensures feasible equilibrium values. Nevertheless, the
ranking of tax regimes persists.
The findings associated with our numerical simulation, then, can be subsumed to
33In calculating welfare, we took into account, that the equilibrium price for merging P reduces second period
income of resident j and m to the symmetric exogenous outside options pij and pim given by eqn. (1) and revenue
from first-period saving. This can be seen by substituting (1 + r)P = p˜ij − pij into (11) and (1 + r)P = pim
into (14). Because of the quasi-linear utility function (4), utility of second period consumption financed by (1) is
excluded from the last columns in table 7 and 8. An inclusion would commonly increase respective values by the
same amount.
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Proposition 4 Provided that the production function of the MNE’s affiliate in country z ∈ {j,m}
is of the type F z(kz) = (a− bkz)kz,
i) no tax regime generally provides Pareto efficiency.
ii) any tax system can be preferable according to the Pareto criterion in case of uncoordinated
national tax revenue maximization. The choice between the EM, the FTADS and the TCS
substantially depends on the parameters of the production function.
iii) the EM is the least inefficient tax rule if governments non-cooperatively maximize domestic
welfare.
iv) government j has a strong interest in relieving double taxation by means of the FTADS.
5. Conclusion
In the present paper, we analyze tax competition with local public good provision in a general
equilibrium model. In contrast to Dickescheid (2004), investment behaviour is presumed to
base on cross-border acquisitions of firms. For the purpose of facilitating results and to ease
notation, the analysis is restrained to one-way investments and multinationals consisting of
two representative affiliates. The investor is supposed to own one of these former independent
representative firms in the first place. Followed by an acquisition of a foreign firm, net profit
generated by the affiliate abroad, then, is fully repatriated to the home country of the investor.
Moreover, the benefit of merging firms is presumed to have a direct effect on production output
as in e.g. Haufler and Schulte (2011). This reflects a deeper integration of merging advantages
as in Becker and Fuest (2011), as they model this benefit in terms of an additively separable
profit boost.
Our main findings are the following. In case of large countries and one multinational enterprise,
treasury income maximization results in inefficiently low tax rates vis-a-vis the EM. Uncoordi-
nated national tax rate setting imposes a well known positive capital flight externality as well
as a positive terms of trade externality. The total tax base externality, thus, turns out to be
positive. Under the TCS as well as under the FTADS, however, another externality emerges,
which in line with Dickescheid is referred to as tax export externality. In our approach, though,
a distinction has to be drawn between a negative direct as well as a negative indirect tax export
effect. The intuition for the former one is as follows. By raising a foreign tax on profit generated
abroad, the government at home forfeits part of the national tax base by less repatriated net in-
come. Furthermore, if the government abroad intensifies taxation, the double tax relief at home
increases. This occurs at the cost of national tax receipts at home. The second indirect effect
bases on the influence of taxation on factor demand. In the FTADS the foreign affiliate treats
both tax rates - at home and abroad - as cost factors, such that levying taxes in any country is
detrimental to tax revenue in the opposite jurisdiction. To gain a better understanding of this
finding, suppose an increase in either tax rate. Thereby the home government loses some tax
base by means of less repatriated income which in turn is based on a decrease in factor demand
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abroad caused by intensified foreign taxation. Likewise, foreign tax receipts suffer from increased
taxation at home as higher production cost lead to diminished production of the affiliate located
in the foreign country and less domestic tax base. Put differently, either tax export externality
represents the incentive of governments to gain tax revenue at the expense of the respective
other country. Considering efficiency properties of taxation in the home country, the indirect
tax export externality is in opposition to the terms of trade externality. Capital movement as
described by the capital flight externality is absent since both affiliates are directly affected by
the respective tax rate. Taxation in the foreign country comes along with all four effects such
that profit taxation can either be too low, efficient or too intense.
Results associated with the TCS differ slightly. First of all recall that we focus on the limited
TCS, see also Davies (2003). At this, the home government is only willing to relief double
taxation if the foreign tax rate is not larger than the domestic counterpart. Given this saving
clause is met, taxes paid by the foreign affiliate to the foreign treasury are entirely refunded by
the home government. The multinational anticipates this rebate and production abroad ends
up to be solely dependent on profit taxation at home. Irrespective of the intensity of taxation,
the foreign tax base will ceteris paribus remain the same. Since our model features only profit
taxation, the foreign government consequently does not need to account for marginal cost of
taxation given by a tax-induced change in production. It sets the national tax rate at the upper
boundary subject to the saving clause as there is only a marginal benefit of taxation, i.e. higher
tax revenue. As a result, tax rates are equal, see Wilson (1999). Turning to the efficiency
properties of the TCS, the negative direct tax export externality inflicted by foreign taxation
remains. Profit taxation at home is shown to feature the same properties as in the FTADS.
Changing the fiscal objective into welfare maximization, the above findings are complemented
by a negative income externality incorporating a tax-induced change in saving return. This
effect accrues to each national resident under the EM and under the FTADS, such that in each
case the overall exsternality is ambiguously signed implying that tax rates are set inefficiently
low, efficient or inefficiently high. Under the TCS, though, it is shown that cooperative tax
rate setting is mandatory to reach an efficient outcome. This finding bases upon the above
argumentation according to taxation in the foreign country. A negative income externality is
not able to arise at home, since the world capital market is not distorted by profit taxation in
the foreign country.
Having interpreted the scenario of two large countries, we next turn to the case of many small
countries the world economy consists of. An implication of this assumption for our model is that
instead of one there are many identical multinational enterprises with overall as many affiliates as
there are countries. We find that in a general equilibrium, the quality of externalities obtained
corresponds with the case of large countries. The main difference, however, is that capital
movement characterized by the capital flight externality occurs between multinationals rather
than within a single enterprise. This is in contrast to the case of large countries, where factors
are shifted between affiliates.
Because of the lack of clearness, we also establish numerical results regarding each fiscal objective.
The simulation shows that no tax system achieves a Pareto efficient allocation in a broad scope
28
of parameter constellations. Instead, it is shown that in case of tax revenue maximization and
with respect to global efficiency a clear-cut decision in favour of one system is impossible to
make. Depending on the parameters of the production function employed, we are able to point
out three according thresholds that each are connected with a different ranking of tax systems.
Considering welfare maximization source-based taxation, i.e. the EM, is found to be preferable
to the TCS, which in turn dominates the FTADS. In each setting, though, the government of
the country net profit is repatriated to is proven to have a strong incentive to reduce double
taxation via the FTADS. At this, national tax yield and national welfare are significantly larger
than under the EM or the TCS.
Eventually, it has to be pointed out, that our results are highly driven by the assumption of
one-way foreign direct investments as well as the absence of greenfield investment. Scrutinizing
efficiency properties of double tax treaties incorporating these extensions is postponed to future
studies.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Comparative static results
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Full taxation after deduction system
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nSr(1− tj)(1− tm)∆¯F
j
kkF
m
kk − (αn − 1)(1 − tjϑ)(1− tm)F
m
kk
−(βn− 1)(1 − tjϑ)F
j
kk + tmϑβn(1− tj)F
j
kk
)
≷ 0
dkm
dtm
=
1
(1− tm)∆¯FmkkC
· [∆¯Fmk − ϑr]
(
nSr(1− tj)(1− tm)∆¯F
j
kkF
m
kk − αn(1− tjϑ)(1− tm)F
m
kk
−(βn− 1)(1 − ϑ(tj + tm − tjtm))F
j
kk
)
< 0
dkm
dtj
=
1
(1− tj)∆¯FmkkC
· [∆¯Fmkk − ϑr]
(
nSr(1− tj)(1− tm)∆¯F
j
kkF
m
kk − (αn − 1)(1− tjϑ)(1− tm)F
m
kk
−tmϑ(1− tj)(1− tm)F
m
kk − (βn− 1)(1 − ϑ(tj + tm − tjtm))F
j
kk
)
< 0
dkj
dtm
=
dr
dtm
(1− tjϑ)
(1− tj)∆¯F
j
kk
> 0
dk−j
dtz
=
dr
dtz
(1− t−jϑ)
(1− t−j)∆¯F
−j
kk
> 0 z ∈ {j,m}
dk−m
dtz
=
dr
dtz
(1− ϑ(t−j + t−m − t−jt−m))
(1− t−j)(1 − t−m)∆¯F
−m
kk
> 0 z ∈ {j,m}
dsi
dtz
= Sir
dr
dtz
< 0 i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, z ∈ {j,m}
where C = nSr(1−tj)(1−tm)∆¯F
j
kkF
m
kk−αn(1−tjϑ)(1−tm)F
m
kk−βn(1−ϑ(tj+tm−tjtm))F
j
kk > 0.
Proof of proposition 1
Proof . The general first-order condition for maximizing government m’s fiscal objective (16),
taking into account (10) to (15), is given by
dYm
dtm
= η
[
du(c˜1m)
dtm
+
dc˜2m
dtm
]
+ Vg
dg˜m
dtm
= 0 (54)
where
du(c˜1m)
dtm
+
dc˜2m
dtm
= sm
dr
dtm
,
32
dg˜m
dtm
=
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
+ tm[∆¯F
m
k − ϑr]
dkm
dtm
− tmϑkm
dr
dtm
If the TCS is implemented in the double taxation treaty and if tj ≥ tm there is only one relevant
tax rate for the MNE, cf. (35) and (36). Recalling comparative static results (37) to (41),
capital demand of the MNE is not affected by profit taxation in country m. It follows that
dkm
dtm
= dr
dtm
= 0 applies in (54). Hence, as long as there is production in country m, equation
(54) reads
dYm
dtm
=
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
> 0
and induces a tax rate in country m that is set at its upper boundary, i. e. tj = tm.
A.2. Proof of lemma 4
Proof . Substitute lim
n→∞
dr
dtj
= lim
n→∞
dr
dtm
= 0 in eqns. (34), (42), (52) and (53). Considering the
EM, we obtain
lim
n→∞
dg˜m
dtj
∣∣∣∣
EM
= 0. (A1)
which is symmetrical. The tax base externality caused by setting tj under the TCS and the
FTADS is generally given by
lim
n→∞
dg˜m
dtj
= tm
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
] dkm
dtj
< 0 (A2)
with
lim
n→∞
dkm
dtj
=
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
(1− tj)∆¯Fmkk
< 0
Under the FTADS, the tax base externality of setting tm reads
lim
n→∞
dg˜j
dtm
= −tj
[
∆¯Fm − ϑrkm
]
+ tj(1− tm)
[
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
] dkm
dtm
< 0 (A3)
with
lim
n→∞
dkm
dtm
=
∆¯Fmk − ϑr
(1− tm)∆¯Fmkk
< 0
Under the TCS the direct tax export externality of setting tm remains unchanged, cf. eqn. (43).
Equations (A2), (A3) as well as (43) are unambiguously negative due to comparative static
results from eqns. (39) and (48) for n→∞.
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